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Abstract
We consider a dynamic pricing problem under unknown demand models. In this problem a seller
offers prices to a stream of customers and observes either success or failure in each sale attempt. The
underlying demand model is unknown to the seller and can take one of N possible forms. In this paper,
we show that this problem can be formulated as a multi-armed bandit with dependent arms. We propose
a dynamic pricing policy based on the likelihood ratio test. We show that the proposed policy achieves
complete learning, i.e., it offers a bounded regret where regret is defined as the revenue loss with respect
to the case with a known demand model. This is in sharp contrast with the logarithmic growing regret
in multi-armed bandit with independent arms.
Index Terms
Dynamic Pricing, multi-armed bandit, maximum likelihood detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
The sequential pricing of a certain good under an unknown demand model is a fundamen-
tal management science problem and has various applications in financial services, electricity
0This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant CCF-0830685 and by the Army Research
Office under Grant W911NF-08-1-0467.
2market, online posted-price auctions of digital goods, and radio spectrum management. In this
problem, a seller offers a sequence of prices of the good to a stream of potential customers and
observes either success or failure in each sale attempt. The characteristic of each customer is
assumed to be identical and is described by a demand model ρ(p) which prescribes the probability
of a successful sale at the offered price p. The demand model is assumed to be unknown to
the seller and needs to be learnt online through sequential observations. Unlike the conventional
operation research and management science constraint on the inventory, we assume that there is
an unlimited supply of the good (consider, for example, the online posted-price auction where
there is an infinity supply of the digital good). The objective is to maximize the total revenue
over a horizon of length T by choosing sequentially the price at each time based on the sale
history. When choosing the price at each step, the seller confronts a tradeoff between exploring
the demand model (learning) and exploiting the price with the best selling history (earning). As
the seller gains information about the unknown demand model from the past selling history, the
seller’s pricing strategy can improve over time.
A. Dynamic Pricing as A Multi-Armed Bandit
Dynamic pricing can be formulated as a special multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem, and the
connection was explored as early as 1974 by Rothschild in [1]. A mathematical abstraction of
MAB in its basic form involves N independent arms and a single player. Each arm, when played,
offers independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random reward drawn from a distribution
with unknown mean θi. At each time, a player chooses one arm to play, aiming to maximize the
expected total rewards obtained over a horizon of length T . Depending on whether the unknown
mean θi of each arm is treated as random variables with known prior distributions or as a
deterministic quantity, MAB problems can be formulated and studied within either a Bayesian
or a non-Bayesian framework.
Within the Bayesian framework, system unknown parameters are random variables, and the
design objective is policies with good average performance (averaged over the prior distributions
of the unknowns). Often, the performance of a policy is measured by the total discounted reward
or the average reward over an infinite horizon. By treating the player’s a posteriori probabilistic
knowledge (updated from the a priori distribution using past observations) on the unknown
parameters as the system state, Bellman in 1956 abstracted and generalized the Bayesian MAB
3to a special class of Markov decision processes (MDP) [2]. In 1970s, Gittins showed that the
optimal policy of MAB has a simple index structure—the so-called Gittins index policy [3]. This
leads to linear (in the number N of arms) complexity in finding the optimal policy, in contrast
to the exponential complexity one would have to face if the problem was solved as a general
MDP.
Within the non-Bayesian framework, the unknowns in the reward models are treated as
deterministic quantities and the design objective is universally (over all possible values of
the unknowns) good policies. A commonly used performance measure is the so-called regret
(a.k.a. the cost of learning) defined as the expected total reward loss with respect to the ideal
scenario of known reward models (under which the arm with the largest reward mean is always
played). To minimize the regret, the player needs to identify the best arm without engaging other
inferior arms too often. In 1985, Lai and Robbins [4] showed that the minimum regret grows
at logarithmic order with T and constructed a policy to achieve the minimum regret for certain
reward distributions.
The connection between MAB and dynamic pricing is now readily seen: each potential price p
is an arm with an unknown reward mean pρ(p) (the expected revenue at price p). When the seller
can choose any price within an interval, the problem becomes a continuum-armed bandit [5]–
[9]. Kleinberg and Leighton in [9] specifically consider an online posted price auction under
an unknown demand model which is a special case of the continuum-armed bandit problem.
In [1], Rothschild considered the case where the seller can choose prices from a finite set
and formulated the problem as a classic MAB within the Bayesian framework assuming prior
probabilistic knowledge of the demand model. His focus was on the question whether a seller
who follows an optimal policy (in terms of total discounted revenue over an infinite horizon) will
eventually obtain complete information about the underlying demand model thus settle at the
optimal price. It was shown in [1] that the answer is in general negative. In light of the theories
on MAB developed since 1974, this conclusion is, perhaps, no longer surprising. The optimal
policy of a Bayesian MAB will always settle at a single arm (after a finite number of visits to
other arms) which is not necessarily the best one. Following Rothschild, McLennan showed that
incomplete learning can occur even when the seller can choose among a continuum of prices [10].
McLennan adopted a simple binary demand model: it is known that one of two possible demand
models ρ0(p) and ρ1(p) pertains with prior probability 1− q0 and q0, respectively.
4Even though the optimal policy offers the best performance averaged over all possible demand
environments under the known prior distribution, the fact that incomplete learning occurs with
positive probability can be unsettling given that a seller may only see one realization of the
demand model and thus cares about only the revenue under this specific realization rather than
on the average over all realizations it might have seen. In this case, a policy that grantees
complete learning under every possible demand model may be desirable, even though it may
not offer the best average performance.
This issue was addressed by Harrison et al. in [11] where they adopted the same binary demand
model considered by McLennan [10] but focused on achieving complete learning under each
realization of the demand model rather than the best average performance. The myopic Bayesian
policy (MBP) and its modified versions were studied. It was shown that although MBP can lead
to incomplete learning, a modified version of MBP will always learn the underlying demand
model completely and settle at the optimal price. If we borrow the performance measure of
regret that is often used within the non-Bayesian framework, complete learning implies a finite
regret that does not grow unboundedly with the horizon length T .
B. Main Results
In this paper, we provide a different approach to the problem considered by McLennan in [10]
and Harrison et al. in [11]. In particular, we adopt the non-Bayesian framework which does not
assume any probabilistic prior knowledge on which demand model may pertain. We show that
completely learning (i.e., finite regret) can be achieved without this prior knowledge. Furthermore,
in contrast to the modified MBP proposed in [11], our proposed policy achieves finite regret
without complete knowledge of the demand curves {ρ0(p), ρ1(p)}. The only knowledge required
in our proposed policy is the optimal prices {p∗0, p∗1} under each demand model and the values
ρi(p
∗
j )’s (i, j ∈ {0, 1}) of the demand models at these two prices. Our results also generalize to
the case with an arbitrary number N of potential demand curves.
Our approach is based on a multi-armed bandit formulation of the problem within the non-
Bayesian framework. In our formulation, each arm 1 ≤ j ≤ N represents the optimal price p∗j
under demand model ρj(p). Since all arms share the same underlying demand model, arms are
correlated. In other words, observations from one arm also provide information on the quality
of other arms by revealing the underlying demand model. Recognizing the detection component
5of this bandit problem with dependent arms, we propose a policy based on the likelihood ratio
test (LRT) and show that it has finite regret. Compared to [11], this result on complete learning
is established in a considerably simpler manner. Furthermore, simulation examples demonstrate
that the proposed LRT policy can outperform the modified MBP policy (CMBP) proposed in
[11].
By introducing exploration prices (the prices with the largest Chernoff distance between the
two demand models that are currently detected as most likely), we show that a variation of the
LRT policy can improve the rate of learning the underlying demand model and reduce regret.
This enhancement, however, requires more knowledge on the demand curves than in the LRT
policy.
In the context of multi-armed bandit, this result provides an interesting case where dependen-
cies across arms can be exploited to achieve finite regret that does not grow unboundedly with
the horizon length T . This is in sharp contrast to a naive approach that ignores arm dependencies
and directly applies the classic MAB policies. The latter would have led to a regret that grows
logarithmic with T .
C. Related Work
Within the Bayesian framework, following Rothschild ( [1]), Easley and Kiefer [12] and
Aghion et al. [13] also studied the achievability of complete learning Aviv and Pazgal in [14]
considered parametric uncertainty in the demand model where a prior distribution of the unknown
parameter is assumed known. They formulated the dynamic pricing problem as a partially
observable Markov decision process (POMDP) and developed upper bounds on the performance
of the optimal policy. They also proposed an active-learning heuristic policy with near optimal
performance. Farias and Roy in [15] considered a similar problem under inventory constraints and
Poisson arrivals of customers and developed near optimal heuristic policies. Keller and Rady
in [16] considered the case under infinite horizon with discounted reward where the demand
model may change over time. In order to learn the underlying demand model, they studied
two qualitatively different heuristics based on exploration (deviating from myopic policy) and
exploitation (close to myopic policy).
Within the non-Bayesian framework, besides regret, another metric mainly considered in the
analysis of auction mechanism [17]–[20] is the competitive ratio defined as R(Sopt)
R(S)
where S is
6the seller’s strategy, Sopt is the optimal fixed-price strategy under the known demand model, and
R(.) is the expected revenue function. Blum et al. showed in [18] that there are randomized
pricing policies achieving competitive ratio 1 + ǫ for any ǫ > 0. This result indicates that R(S)
can converge to R(Sopt) but it does not reveal the rate of convergence. In this paper we analyze
the additive regret R(Sopt)−R(S) (a more strict metric than competitive ratio) and focus on the
growth of regret with the time horizon length.
As mentioned earlier, Kleinberg and Leighton in [9] studied dynamic pricing (online posted
price auctions) as a special continuum-armed bandit problem. In particular, they analyzed the
regret for three different cases of demand models. In the first scenario the customer’s evaluations
equal to an unknown single price in [0, 1] and the customers will only accept the offered price if
it is below their evaluation. Kleinberg and Leighton showed that there is a deterministic pricing
strategy achieving regret O(log log T ) and no pricing strategy can achieve regret o(log log T )
where T is the horizon length (or equivalently, the number of customers). In the second scenario
the customer’s evaluations are independent random samples from a fixed unknown probability
distribution on [0, 1]. This model implies that the demand curve is the complement cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of a certain random variable, which is more restrictive than a general
demand model. For this scenario they showed that there is a pricing strategy achieving regret
O(
√
T log T ). The last scenario considered in [9] makes no stochastic assumptions about the
demand model. It is shown that there is a pricing strategy achieving regret O((T 2/3(log T )1/3) and
no pricing strategy can achieve regret o(T 2/3). Besbes and Zeevi in [21] considered a dynamic
pricing problem under both parametric and non-parametric uncertainty models. They obtained
lower bounds on the regret and developed algorithms that achieve a regret close to the lower
bound.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a seller who offers a particular product to customers who come sequentially. For
each customer, the seller proposes a price p from interval [l, u]; the customer accepts the price
p with probability ρ(p). We call function ρ(.) the demand model.
Before the first customer arrives, nature chooses a demand model from the set {ρi(.)}N−1i=0 as
the ambient demand model. This choice is unknown to the seller; but the seller has knows the
set of the potential demand models {ρi(.)}N−1i=0 (as shown later, this assumption can be relaxed
7in the proposed policy). If price pt is offered to the t-th customer, the seller observes a binary
random variable ot where ot = 1 (success) happens with probability ρ(pt) and ot = 0 (failure)
otherwise. The expected revenue at time t if the underlying demand model is ρi(.) is
ri(pt) = ptρi(pt).
The seller aims to maximize the total revenue by offering prices sequentially. Under a horizon
of length T , the pricing policy is defined formally as the sequence a = (a1, a2, . . . , aT ), where
at is a map from past observations ∪t−1j=1(pj, oj) to a choice of price in [l, u]. When there is no
confusion, at is also used to denote the action taken at time t.
The expected total revenue if the underlying demand model is ρi(.) can be written as
Rai (T ) = E
a
i {
T∑
t=1
ri(pt)}.
The regret defined as the expected revenue loss with respect to a seller who knows the underlying
demand model is given by
∆ai (T ) = [Tri(p
∗
i )− Rai (T )].
It is easy to see that maximizing Rai (T ) is equivalent to minimizing ∆ai (T ).
III. THE BAYESIAN APPROACH
In this section we give a brief review of the work by Harrison et al. in [11] developed within
the Bayesian framework for the special case of N = 2. In the Bayesian approach, the seller
is equipped with priori knowledge of the underlying demand model: the seller knows that the
underlying demand model is ρ1(.) with probability q0. The objective of the seller is to maximize
the expected average revenue
max
a
Ra(T ) = q0R
a
1(T ) + (1− q0)Ra0(T ). (1)
It is equivalent to minimizing the expected regret,
min
a
∆a(T ) = q0∆
a
1(T ) + (1− q0)∆a0(T ) (2)
For finite time horizon T , this problem can be formulated as a partially observable Markov
decision process (POMDP).
State space: S = 0, 1 represents demand model 0 or 1 respectively.
8Action space: A = [l, u] represents all possible prices pt ∈ [l, u].
Observation space: O = {0, 1}, where 1 represents success, and 0 represents failure in sale.
Transition probability: paij = Pr{St+1 = i|St = j, At = a}.
In our problem,
pa11 = p
a
00 = 1,
pa01 = p
a
10 = 0.
Observation model: haj,θ = Pr{Ot = θ|St+1 = j, At = a}. We have
ha00 = 1− ρ0(a),
ha01 = ρ0(a),
ha10 = 1− ρ1(a),
ha11 = ρ1(a).
Immediate reward: The instant reward in state i, when the action a is chosen and θ is
observed is rai,θ = θa.
Policy: a = [a1, . . . , aT ] where at is a mapping from the action and observation history
{{A1, . . . , At−1}, {O1, . . . , Ot−1}} to the action space A.
In POMDPs the sufficient statistics of the action and observation history
H t−1 = {{A1, . . . , At−1}, {O1, . . . , Ot−1}},
for choosing the optimal action at each time is the posterior probability of the state at time t.
This probability is referred to as belief or information state and is defined as
qt = Pr{St = 1|H t−1}, (3)
Qt = [1− qt, qt].
Optimality equations: The optimal policy at each time step t is a function of the current belief
qt and is defined as follows [22]. Let Vt(qt) be the maximum total expected reward obtained
from time steps t+ 1 to T .
VT (qT ) = max
a∈A
{
1∑
i=0
QT (i)
1∑
θ=0
hai,θr
a
i,θ}, (4)
Vt(qt) = max
a∈A
{
1∑
i=0
Qt(i)
1∑
θ=0
hai,θr
a
i,θ +
1∑
θ=0
Pr{Ot = θ|at}Vt+1(Γ(qt|at, θ))},
9where Γ(qt|at, θ)) = qt+1 is called the belief update and is defined as
qt+1 = Pr{St+1 = 1|qt, at, θt} (5)
=
qtρ1(at)
θt(1− ρ1(at))1−θt
qtρ1(at)θt(1− ρ1(at))1−θt + (1− qt)ρ0(at)θt(1− ρ0(at))1−θt .
The value function V0(q0) is equivalent to (1), and (2) stated earlier.
The optimal policy of the above formulated POMDP offers the maximum expected total
revenue. However, finding the optimal policy to a POMDP is P-SAPCE hard in general [23].
Harrison et al. in [11] considered the suboptimal myopic policy and focused on whether finite
regret (i.e., complete learning) can be achieved rather than minimizing the exact value of the
expected regret. The myopic Bayesian policy (MBP) at each step picks the price that maximizes
the current expected revenue
pt = arg max
p∈[l,u]
{qtr1(p) + (1− qt)r0(p)}.
where qt is the belief at time t defined in (3) and (5). For any pricing policy that offers prices
from the range [l, u] it was shown in [11] that the belief converges to a limit almost surely.
The limiting belief does not necessarily equal to 0 or 1 (complete learning); it is possible
that the policy gets stuck at a so-called uninformative price. The uninformative price is the
price at which both demand models ρ0(p) and ρ1(p) are equal. In order to deal with this issue,
δ-discriminative policies were considered. In particular a policy is δ-discriminative if
|ρ0(at(q))− ρ1(at(q))| > δ, ∀t.
It was shown in [11] that if a policy is δ-discriminative, the belief will converge to either 0 or
1 exponentially fast. Therefore by restricting the MBP policy to be δ-discriminative (referred to
CMBP in [11]) finite regret can be achieved.
IV. THE NON-BAYESIAN APPROACH
In this section we present our main result developed within the non-Bayesian framework. We
first consider N = 2 and leave the general case to Sec. V. We assume no prior probabilistic
knowledge on which demand model may pertain. We formulate this problem as a two-armed
bandit problem within the non-Bayesian framework as follows. Let
p∗k = arg max
p∈[l,u]
pρk(p). k = 0, 1.
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Arm k, k = 0, 1, is defined as the price p∗k. If the underlying demand model is ρk(.), arm k is the
better arm. Activating arm k is defined as offering price p∗k to the costumers. The reward random
variable Xk for arm k is defined as the revenue by proposing price p∗k at each time. The reward
mean of arm k is E[Xk] = p∗kρi(p∗k) when ρi(.) is the unknown underlying demand model.
Throughout this paper we assume that no p∗k is an uninformative price under any underlying
demand model, meaning that for both k = 0, 1,
ρ1(p
∗
k) 6= ρ0(p∗k).
This assumption is needed in order to achieve finite regret.
Activating each arm (offering price p∗k) gives i.i.d. realizations of random reward Xk. Since
both arms share the same underlying demand model ρi(.), arms are correlated.In other words,
observations from one arm also provide information on the quality of the other arm.
We define regret or revenue loss as the following:
∆i = Tp
∗
iρi(p
∗
i )−
2∑
k=1
{p∗kρi(p∗k)E[Tk]}
where Tk is the number of times that arm k is selected, and ρi(.) is the true underlying demand
model.
A. The LRT Policy
In this section, we propose the LRT policy and establish its finite regret. For each arm k, let
Yk denote the seller’s observation when it activates arm k. It is a binary random variable with
meanρi(p
∗
k). The LRT policy at each time step t is a function at mapping from the observation
space {y1, y2, . . . , yi, . . . , yt−1} to the action space {0, 1} (arms of the bandit). Specifically, in
the first step t = 1, the LRT policy chooses an arm k ∈ {0, 1} by flipping a fair coin. For each
t > 1, let
L(t) =
1
t
t∑
j=1
log
f1(yj)
f0(yj)
, (6)
where fi(yj) = Pr{Yaj = yj|ρ(.) = ρi(.)} is the probability of observing yj when action aj is
chosen if the underlying demand model were ρi(.). Then the LRT policy at each time step t
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decides which arm to activate based on the following
L(t− 1)
at = 1
R
at = 0
0, (7)
where at denotes the action at time t. It is easy to see that L(t) can be updated recursively as
L(t) =
1
t
[(t− 1)L(t− 1) + log f1(yt)
f0(yt)
].
The LRT policy is based on the maximum likelihood detector. In the following theorem we show
that the LRT policy has finite regret.
Theorem 1: The LRT policy achieves a bounded regret.
Proof: The proof is a special case of the proof of Theorem 2 by setting η0 = η1 = 0
B. The XLRT Policy
In this section we propose a generalization of the LRT policy to improve its regret performance.
Based on the underlying detection nature of the problem, we generalize the LRT policy by
introducing an exploration price. We aim to choose a price as our exploration price in order to
accelerate the learning of the underlying demand model.
In particular, this exploration price should be chosen such that ρ1(p) and ρ0(p) are most easily
distinguished from random observations. Recognizing the detection nature of the problem, we
adopt the Chernoff distance [24] which measures the distance between two distributions by the
asymptotic exponential decay rate of the probability of detection errors. Specifically, for two
probability density functions f0 and f1, the Chernoff distance is given by
C(f0, f1) = max
0≤t≤1
− logµ(t), (8)
µ(t) =
∫
[f0(x)]
1−t[f1(x)]
tdx.
Since calculating the Chernoff distance involves an optimization step, obtaining an analytical
solution can be tedious. Johnson and Sinanovic in [25] stated that the harmonic average of the
Kullback-Leibler divergences [26] of f0 and f1 can be a good approximation of the Chernoff
distance which is easy to calculate. Namely,
Cˆ(f0, f1) = 11
I(f0||f1)
+ 1
I(f1||f0)
, (9)
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where the Kullback-Leibler divergence of f0 with respect to f1 is given by
I(f0||f1) =
∫
f0(x) log
f0(x)
f1(x)
dx. (10)
Note that Kullback-Leibler divergence is not symmetric and the Chernoff distance can be thought
of as the symmetrized Kullback-Leibler divergence.
The exploration price is thus chosen as the price that maximizes the Chernoff distance
C(ρ1(p), ρ0(p)). Observations obtained by this price are the most informative in distinguishing
the two possible candidates of the demand model. The exploration price is offered when the log-
likelihood ratio L(t) is close to 0, i.e., when it is most uncertain which demand model pertains.
This is done by introducing two thresholds η1, and −η0 instead of the single threshold 0 in the
LRT policy (see (7)). The resulting policy is referred to XLRT as detailed below.
Set the exploration price as
px = arg max
p∈[l,u]
{C(ρ1(p), ρ0(p))}. (11)
At each step t:
pt =


p∗0 L(t− 1) < −η0
px −η0 ≤ L(t− 1) ≤ η1
p∗1 η1 ≤ L(t− 1)
, (12)
where L(t− 1) is the log likelihood ratio given in (6) and the two thresholds should satisfy the
following conditions:
η1 < min{I(ρ1(p∗1), ρ0(p∗1)), I(ρ1(px), ρ0(px)), I(ρ1(p∗0), ρ0(p∗0))},
η0 < min{I(ρ0(p∗1), ρ1(p∗1)), I(ρ0(px), ρ1(px)), I(ρ0(p∗0), ρ1(p∗0))}.
This policy differs from the LRT policy only when the likelihood ratio L(t) is close to zero
(indicating a greater degree of uncertainty on the underlying demand model). At such time
instants, XLRT chooses the price px that is most informative in learning the underlying demand
model. Simulation examples demonstrate that XLRT policy improves the performance of the
LRT policy (see Sec. VI).
Theorem 2: The XLRT policy achieves a bounded regret.
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Proof: Without loss of generality, we assume that the underlying demand model is ρ1(.).
Let Me denote the expected number of times that the XLRT policy chooses the non-optimal
price.
Me = E[
T∑
t=1
1{1
t
t∑
j=1
log
f
aj
1 (yj)
f
aj
0 (yj)
< η1}] ≤
∞∑
t=1
E[1{1
t
t∑
j=1
log
f
aj
1 (yj)
f
aj
0 (yj)
< η1}]
=
∞∑
t=1
Pr{1
t
t∑
j=1
log
f
aj
1 (yj)
f
aj
0 (yj)
< η1},
where 1{.} is the indicator function. Note that both the action aj and the observation yj at time
j are random variables. To simplify the notation, let Zajj = log
f
aj
1 (yj)
f
aj
0 (yj)
. We then have
Pr{1
t
t∑
j=1
log
f
aj
1 (yj)
f
aj
0 (yj)
< η1} = Pr{1
t
t∑
j=1
Z
aj
j < η1}
= E[Pr{1
t
t∑
j=1
Z
aj
j < η1|{aj}tj=1}].
where the expectation is over the action sequence {aj}tj=1.
Notice that the action aj at each time j takes three possible values: {p∗0, px, p∗1}. We label these
three prices as p(1) = p∗0, p(2) = px, and p(3) = p∗1, and let Zkj = log
fk1 (yj)
fk0 (yj)
= log
f
aj=p(k)
1 (yj)
f
aj=p(k)
0 (yj)
denote the log-likelihood ratio conditioned on that price p(k) (k = 1, 2, 3) is chosen. It is
easy to see that for each k = 1, 2, 3, Zkj ’s are i.i.d. binary random variables taking the val-
ues {log fk1 (0)
fk0 (0)
, log
fk1 (1)
fk0 (1)
} with probabilities 1 − ρ1(p(k)) and ρ1(p(k)), respectively. Since the
underlying demand model is ρ1(.), we have
E[Zkj ] = E1[log
fk1 (yj)
fk0 (yj)
] = I(ρ1(p(k))||ρ0(p(k))) > 0,
where I(α||β) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence of two Bernoulli random variables with means
α, and β.
Let mk = min{log f
k
1 (0)
fk0 (0)
, log
fk1 (1)
fk0 (1)
}, Mk = max{log f
k
1 (0)
fk0 (0)
, log
fk1 (1)
fk0 (1)
}, m = min{m1, m2, m3},
and M = max{M1,M2,M3}. Zkj ’s are independent and bounded in the interval [m,M ] for all
k = 1, 2, 3.
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Let Θtk = {j : aj = k, j ≤ t} for k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, then
Pr{1
t
t∑
j=1
Z
aj
j < η1} = E[Pr{
1
t
t∑
j=1
Z
aj
j < η1|{aj}tj=1}]
= E[Pr{1
t
t∑
j=1
Z
aj
j < η1|{aj}tj=1,∪3k=1Θtk}]
= E[Pr{1
t
3∑
k=1
∑
h∈Θt
k
Zkh < η1|{aj}tj=1,∪3k=1Θtk}]
= E[Pr{1
t
3∑
k=1
∑
h∈Θt
k
Zkh < η1| ∪3k=1 Θtk}]
= E[Pr{1
t
3∑
k=1
∑
h∈Θt
k
(Zkh − E[Zkh ]) < −(
1
t
3∑
k=1
∑
h∈Θt
k
E[Zkh ]− η1)| ∪3k=1 Θtk}].
The second equality is because the sigma-algebra generated by ∪3k=1Θtk is subset of the sigma-
algebra generated by {aj}tj=1. The fourth equality is because the conditional event {1t
∑3
k=1
∑
h∈Θt
k
Zkh <
η1| ∪3k=1 Θtk} is independent of {aj}tj=1.
Note that conditioned on ∪3k=1Θtk, the sum
∑3
k=1
∑
h∈Θt
k
(Zkh−E[Zkh ]) is the sum of t indepen-
dent zero mean random variables. The rest of the proof is based on the following Hoeffding’s
inequality.
Hoeffding’s inequality: Let Xi’s be independent random variables that are almost surely
bounded in [mi,Mi], i.e., Pr{Xi ∈ [mi,Mi]} = 1, then for some α > 0,
Pr{1
t
t∑
i=1
(Xi − E[Xi]) < −α} ≤ exp{− 2α
2t2∑t
i=1(Mi −mi)2
} (13)
Therefore Hoeffding’s inequality can be used for the conditional probability inside the expec-
tation for independent random variables Zkh’s that are bounded in [m,M ] to obtain
Pr{1
t
3∑
k=1
∑
hn(t)Θt
k
(Zkh − E[Zkh ]) < −(
1
t
3∑
k=1
∑
h∈Θt
k
E[Zkh ]− η1)| ∪3k=1 Θtk}
≤ Pr{1
t
3∑
k=1
∑
h∈Θt
k
(Zkh − E[Zkh ]) < −( min
k=1,2,3
{I(ρ1(p(k))||ρ0(p(k)))} − η1)| ∪3k=1 Θtk}
= Pr{1
t
3∑
k=1
∑
h∈Θt
k
(Zkh − E[Zkh ]) < −a| ∪3k=1 Θtk} ≤ exp{−
2a2t
(M −m)2} = exp{−
t
C
},
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where a = min
k=1,2,3
{I(ρ1(p(k))||ρ0(p(k)))} − η1 and C = (M−m)
2
2a2
. Recall that the thresholds are
chosen such that η1 < min
k=1,2,3
{I(ρ1(p(k))||ρ0(p(k)))} based on definition. Therefore a > 0. Hence
Pr{1
t
t∑
j=1
Z
aj
j < η1} = E[Pr{
1
t
t∑
j=1
Z
aj
j < η1|{aj}tj=1}] ≤ E[Pr{
1
t
3∑
k=1
∑
h∈Θt
k
(Zkh − E[Zkh ]) < −a| ∪3k=1 Θtk}]
≤ E[exp{− t
C
}] = exp{− t
C
}.
Hence
Me ≤
∞∑
t=1
Pr{1
t
t∑
j=1
log
f
aj
1 (yj)
f
aj
0 (yj)
< η1} ≤
∞∑
t=1
exp{− t
C
} ≤
∫ ∞
t=0
exp{− t
C
} = C <∞.
It shows that the expected number of times the non-optimal price is chosen is bounded by a
finite number C. Therefore regret for the LRT policy is bounded above by C multiplied by a
constant.
V. EXTENSION TO FINITE SPACE DEMAND UNCERTAINTY
In this section we extend the LRT and XLRT policies to handle finite-space demand uncertainty
where the underlying demand model is taken from a set {ρ0(.), . . . , ρN−1(.)} with an arbitrary
finite cardinality N .
This problem can be formulated as a multi-armed bandit problem in the same way as in
section IV. Arm k, k = 0, . . . , N − 1, is defined as the price p∗k where
p∗k = arg max
p∈[l,u]
pρk(p). k = 0, . . . , N − 1.
If the underlying demand model is ρk(.), arm k is the best arm. As mentioned earlier in order to
achieve finite regret we assume that no optimal price is uninformative under any demand model.
In other words for all j, h, k ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, j 6= h,
ρj(p
∗
k) 6= ρh(p∗k).
The regret is also defined in a similar way as
∆i = Tp
∗
iρi(p
∗
i )−
N−1∑
k=0
{p∗kρi(p∗k)E[Tk]}
where Tk is the number of times that arm k is selected.
We present the extended versions of LRT and XLRT (referred to as ELRT and EXLRT)
policies for an arbitrary N number of potential demand models. We also show that the proposed
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ELRT policy achieves finite regret. Similarly, for each arm k, define the binary random variable
Yk ∈ {0, 1} with mean ρi(p∗k). Yk is the random variable indicating the seller’s observation when
it activates arm k (i.e., offers price p∗k). The ELRT policy at each time step t is a function at
mapping from the observation space {y1, y2, . . . , yi, . . . , yt−1} to the action space {0, . . . , N−1}
(arms of the bandit). For the first step t = 1, choose an arm uniformly from k ∈ {0, . . . , N −1}.
For the time step t > 1, let
Li,h(t) =
1
t
t∑
j=1
log
fi(yj)
fh(yj)
, (14)
where fi(yj) = Pr{Yaj = yj|ρ(.) = ρi(.)} is the probability of observing yj when action aj is
chosen if the underlying demand model is ρi(.).
The ELRT policy at each time step t selects arm at = k for which
Lk,j(t− 1) > 0, ∀j ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, j 6= k. (15)
Theorem 3: The ELRT policy achieves a bounded regret.
Proof: The proof is a direct generalization of the Theorem 1 and is given in Appendix for
completeness.
Similarly, we can introduce exploration prices to improve the rate of learning. Since there are
now N possible demand models, there are N − 1 possible exploration prices. At each time,
when the likelihood ration between the two models that are detected as the most likely is close
to 0, the exploration price defined by the Chernoff distance between these two demand models
is offered. Specifically, let
pi,hx = arg max
p∈[l,u]
{C(ρi(p), ρh(p))}. (16)
At each time step t the policy first finds the two most probable demand models d1 and d2, where
model d1 satisfies
Ld1,j(t− 1) > 0 ∀j ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, j 6= d1, (17)
and model d2 satisfies
Ld2,j(t− 1) > 0 ∀j ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, j 6= d1, j 6= d2, (18)
Then
pt =


p∗d1 Ld1,d2(t− 1) > ηd1,d2
pd1,d2x 0 ≤ Ld1,d2(t− 1) ≤ ηd1,d2
,
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where the threshold ηd1,d2 is chosen to satisfy the following conditions:
ηd1,d2 < min{I(ρd1(p∗d1), ρd2(p∗d1)), I(ρd1(pd1,d2x ), ρd2(pd1,d2x )), I(ρd1(p∗d2), ρd2(p∗d2))}.
VI. SIMULATIONS
In this section we study the performance of the proposed policies. In Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 shows
the comparison of the LRT policy with the constrained MBP (CMBP)proposed in [11] under a
binary demand model sets chosen in [11]. In these two examples, we consider the same demand
models used in the simulation studies in [11]. In particular, in Fig. 1, ρ0(p) = 1.4 − 0.9p and
ρ1(p) = 0.8 − 0.3p for the price range of [0.5, 1.5], and in Fig. 2, ρ0(p) = 11+exp(−10+10p) and
ρ1(p) =
1
1+exp(−1+0.5p)
for the price range of [0, 4]. The initial belief is chosen to be q0 = 0.5.
We observe that the proposed LRT policy outperforms CMBP in both cases.
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Fig. 1. CMBP vs. LRT: Case 1
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show the comparison of XLRT policy with LRT for the demand models
ρ0(p) = 1.4−0.9p and ρ1(p) = 0.8−0.3p when the underlying demand model is ρ0(.) and ρ1(.)
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Fig. 2. CMBP vs. LRT: Case 2
respectively. We observe that introducing the exploration price in XLRT considerably improves
the regret.
VII. CONCLUSION
The dynamic pricing problem when the underlying demand model is unknown to the seller
is considered where the demand model takes one of N possible forms where N is any arbitrary
number. A non-Bayesian approach in which no prior knowledge on which demand model is
governing the market is studied. The problem is formulated as a multi-armed bandit with
correlated arms. A policy based on the likelihood ratio test is developed that achieves finite
regret. An generalization of this policy is proposed by introducing an exploration price that helps
the seller to learn the underlying demand model faster and improve the regret performance.
APPENDIX: PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Without loss of generality, we assume that the underlying demand model is ρi(.).
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Fig. 3. XLRT vs. LRT when ρ = ρ0
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Fig. 4. XLRT vs. LRT when ρ = ρ1
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Let Me denote the expected number of times that the ELRT policy chooses the non-optimal
price.
Me ≤
N−1∑
h=0,h 6=i
E[
T∑
t=1
1{1
t
t∑
j=1
log
f
aj
i (yj)
f
aj
h (yj)
< 0}]
≤
N−1∑
h=0,h 6=i
∞∑
t=1
E[1{1
t
t∑
j=1
log
f
aj
i (yj)
f
aj
h (yj)
< 0}]
=
N−1∑
h=0,h 6=i
∞∑
t=1
Pr{1
t
t∑
j=1
log
f
aj
i (yj)
f
aj
h (yj)
< 0}.
Note that both the action aj and the observation yj at time j are random variables. To simplify
the notation consider a fixed h and let Zajj = log
f
aj
i (yj)
f
aj
h
(yj)
. At each time j, the policy aj chooses
one of the N possible prices p∗k’s, k = 0, . . . , N − 1. For each chosen price p∗k, yj is a Bernoulli
random variable. Let Zkj = log
fki (yj)
fk
h
(yj)
= log
f
aj=k
i (yj)
f
aj=k
h
(yj)
denote the log-likelihood ratio conditioned
on that price p∗k is chosen. It is easy to see that for each k = 0, . . . , N − 1, Zkj ’s are i.i.d. binary
random variables taking the values {log fki (0)
fk
h
(0)
, log
fki (1)
fk
h
(1)
} with probabilities 1− ρi(p∗k) and ρi(p∗k)
respectively. Since the underlying demand model is ρi(.), we have
E[Zkj ] = Ei[log
fki (yj)
fkh (yj)
] = I(ρi(p
∗
k)||ρh(p∗k)) > 0.
Let mhk = min{log f
k
i (0)
fk
h
(0)
, log
fki (1)
fk
h
(1)
}, Mhk = max{log f
k
i (0)
fk
h
(0)
, log
fki (1)
fk
h
(1)
}, mh = min{mh1 , . . . , mhN},
and Mh = max{Mh1 , . . . ,MhN}. Zkj ’s are independent and bounded in the interval [mh,Mh].
Following the steps in the proof of Theorem 2 for η0 = η1 = 0 and conditioning on the event
∪N−1k=0 Θtk as the sufficient statistic for the action history {aj}tj=1 one can get
Pr{1
t
t∑
j=1
log
f
aj
i (yj)
f
aj
h (yj)
< 0} ≤ exp{− t
Ch
}
where Ch = (Mh−mh)
2
2a2
h
and ah = mink=0,...,N−1{I(ρi(p∗k)||ρh(p∗k)). Hence
Me ≤
N−1∑
h=0,h 6=i
∞∑
t=1
Pr{1
t
t∑
j=1
log
f
aj
i (yj)
f
aj
h (yj)
< 0} ≤
N−1∑
h=0,h 6=i
∞∑
t=1
exp{− t
Ch
}
≤
N−1∑
h=0,h 6=i
∫ ∞
t=0
exp{− t
Ch
} ≤ (N − 1)C <∞,
where C = maxN−1h=0,h 6=i{Ch}.
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It shows that the expected number of times the non-optimal price is chosen is bounded by a
finite number (N − 1)C. Therefore regret for the LRT policy is bounded above by (N − 1)C
multiplied by a constant.
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